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RECENT CASES

license suspended?", "Did you know that D spent twelve days in jail and was fined
twenty-five dollars for drunkenness on January 10, 1949?" and "Did you know D was
given twenty days fdr vagrancy in the city jail of Walla Walla?" Held: The form of
the questions was proper as long as it was not for the purpose of discerditing the person on trial. State v. Cyr, 40 Wn. 2d 840, 246 P2d 480 (1952).
The holding in the instant case puts Washington among the small minority of states
which allow the prosecution to ask, on cross-examination of defendant's character witness, whether such witness has any personal knowledge of specific acts of misconduct committed by the defendant. State v. Jacobs, 195 La. 281, 196 So. 347 (1940). The
Washington cases which support the minority rule and upon which the court relied
in the instant case are State v. Austin, 83 Wash. 444, 145 Pac. 451 (1915) and State v.
Stilts, 181 Wash. 305, 42 P. 2d 779 (1935). In these cases the court held that questions
asked of character witnesses as to their knowledge of specific acts of the accused were
within the bounds of legitimate cross-examination as long as the purpose was only to
discredit the testimony of the witness. See also State v. McMullen, 142 Wash. 7, 252
Pac. 108 (1927) ; State v. Bosozich, 145 Wash. 227, 259 Pac. 395 (1927) ; cf. State v.
Coates, 22 Wash. 601, 61 Pac. 726 (1900) (testimony as to general reputation alone
allowed).
The majority rule allows the prosecution to cross-examine defendant's character witnesses only as to rumors or reports of particular acts of misconduct committed by the
defendant. Stewart v. United States, 104 F.2d 234 (App. D.C. 1939); Michelson v.
United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948) ; State v. Miller,60 Ida. 79, 88 P. 2d 526 (1939) ; 3
WIGUORE, EVIENCE § 988 (3rd ed. 1940). In the Michelson case, the basis for the
majority rule was concisely explained by Mr. Justice Jackson: "Since the whole inquiry,... is calculated to ascertain the general talk of people about defendant, rather
than the witness' own knowledge of. him, the form of inquiry 'Have you heard?' has
general approval, and 'Do you -know' is not allowed. . it is not the man that he is,
but the name that he has which is put in issue."
The form of inquiry, "Do you know?" indicates to the jury that the prosecutor has
definite information that the defendant has been guilty of a series of offenses by not
in any way distinguishing between rumor and fact of such offenses. This results in
prejudicing the accused in the mind of the jury. It is suggested that the form of qu stion allowed by the majority, "Have you heard?," keeps the prosecution within the
stated purpose of cross-examination of character witnesses and lessens the chance of
prejudicing the defendant in the mind of the jury by minimizing references to the fact
that the defendant has been guilty of prior acts of misconduct.
MIcHAEL. MINEs

Insurance--Conafict of Interests--Bad Faith of Insurer. P, the insured under a public
liability insurance policy with D, had been sued by an injured party; one of the grounds
alleged for recovery was expressly excepted by the terms of the policy. D insisted on
its policy right to control the defense and also to withdraw and disclaim all liability if
at the trial the loss was found to be outside the policy coverage. P objected to the reservation of rights by D, pointing out that it would be to D's interest at the trial to allow proof of the loss on grounds outside the policy coverage and thus escape all liability. D then offered to allow P's counsel to assist in the defense and P accepted. P,
subject to potential liability in excess of the policy's limits, negotiated a settlement
within the policy's limits, to which D refused to contribute. P paid the settlement and

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[AuousT

and seeks to recover from D, alleging breach of contract in insisting upon a conditional defense, and bad faith in not cooperating in settlement. As an affirmative defense D
pleaded the policy clause that "no action" shall be maintained against the insurer
until the amount of loss was determined by judgment against the insured or by written consent of insurer, insured, and claimant. Trial court found D guilty of breach of
contract and bad faith as alleged and gave P judgment for the amount of the settlement plus attorney's fees. Appeal. Held. Affirmed. When an insurer has been guilty
of bad faith in failing to cooperate toward a settlement, the insured may make a
fair settlement and recover the same within the policy limits, from the insurer. Further,
since the bad faith of the insurer in not performing his contract obligations sounds m
tort, the "no action" contract clause is inapplicable as a defense. Evans v. Continental
Casualty Co., 40 Wn. 2d 614, 245 P. 2d 470 (1952).
This is the first appellate case in Washington in which an insurer has been called
upon to defend an insured against a suit alleging grounds within and without policy.
A definite "conflict of interests" results from such a suit. If the insurer defends with a
reservation of rights it will be to the insurer's advantage to allow the complainant to
recover judgment on grounds outside the coverage of the policy and thereby avoid liability. If the insurer accepts an unconditional defense he is generally held to have
waived his immunity from losses outside the coverage of the policy. This may be mferred from the cases which hold that notice of reservation of right is necessary to prevent waiver. Eakie v. Hayes, 185 Wash. 520, 55 P.2d 1072 (1936). Foreign courts, in
dealing with this problem, have held that if the insurer allows the insured to participate
in the defense, and reserves his right to withdraw and disclaim liability under the
policy, the rights of both parties are properly protected. Fidelity and Casualty Co. v.
Stewart Drygoods Co., 208 Ky. 429, 271 S.W 444 (1925) ;Compton Hesghts Laundry
Co. v. General Accident, Fire, and Life Assurance Corporation,195 Mo. App. 313, 190
S.W 382 (1917). In the face of this authority it is understandable that the court
avoided a discussion of the breach of contract finding of the trial court, which was assigned as error, and chose to base its opinion entirely upon the bad faith finding.
This decision extends considerably the scope of liability of public liability insurers,
who now, if found guilty of bad faith, may be subject to liability for the amount of
extrajudicial agreement to which they are not parties and concerning which they had
no opportunity to protect their own interests. There is authority for allowing recovery
of a settlement amount from an insurer who has flatly denied liability and refused to
defend. L. J. Dowell, Inc. v. United Pacific Casualty Ins. Co., 191 Wash. 666, 72 P2d
296 (1937). Recovery of a judgment rendered against the insured, from an insurer
who has been guilty of bad faith has been allowed. Burnham v. Commercial Casualty
Ins. Co., 10 Wn.2d 624, 117 P2d 644 (1941). But there appears to be no previous
authority for recovery of a settlement amount from an insurer on grounds of bad
faith.
Apparently because of the lack of direct authority, the court, reasoning by analogy,
said, "The situation presented here [insurer's non-cooperation in settlement] does not
differ in principal from that in which insurer denies its liability and refuses to defend."
Ths rather strained analogy enables the court to rest its decision on the authority of
cases supporting the proposition to which the analogy is drawn. Traders and General
Ins. Co. v. Rudco Oil and Gas Co., 129 F.2d 621 (C.A. 10th 1942). This case, principally relied upon by the court, may be distinguished, however, in that, in the instant
case, the insurer did not deny liability and refuse to defend, but rather refused to cooperate in settlement negotiations, a notable difference.
The court disposes of the defense of the "no action" clause by holding that this
action, based on the bad faith of the insurer in failing to perform a contract obligation,
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sounds in tort, and therefore the contract defense is inapplicable. A finding of bad faith
may follow from a neglect or refusal to fulfill some contract obligation, Bundy v.
Commercial Credit Co., 202 N.C. 604, 163 S.E. 676 (1932), and an action based
thereon sounds in tort, Johnson v. Hardware Mutual Casulty Co., 108 Vt. 269, 187 A.
788 (1936). The court does not state what contract obligation was unfulfilled. There
is no- contractual obligation of the insurer to settle or compromise suits against
the insured. The court must have been referring to the implied obligation of the insurer to use good faith because of a fiduciary relationship arising from the insured's
having surrendered all right to defend suits or effect compromises. Amerscan Fidelity
and Casualty Co. v. .l,4 American Bus Lines, 179 F.2d 7 (C.A. 10th 1949).
It is unfortunate that the trial court never determined whether the loss was within
the policy coverage. Similar litigation might be avoided by several courses of action.
(1) Force the insurer to elect to defend unconditionally or surrender the defense to the
insured. Then if the damage suit reveals loss within the policy coverage, the insured
may recover from the insurer in a separate suit if necessary, although payment by
the insurer would be almost certain in view of the evidence indicating that the loss
was within the policy coverage; (2) Allow counsel of the insurer and the insured to
participate in the defense, thus giving protection to the interests of both. This is the
method suggested by the Fidelity and Conpton cases, supra; (3) Either of the foregoing solutions could be carried out by a provision in our Insurance Code directing the
course of action to be pursued when similar "conflicts of interest" arise.
MYRON J. CARLSON

Practice and Procedure-Rule 16--Grounds for Granting New Trial. P sued D for
malpractice. After a verdict for P, the trial court granted D's motion for new trial,
citing Rule 16, sub. 9 of the General Rules of the Superior Court, 34A Wn2d 117,
i.e., "substantial justice has not been done." The court listed in the order granting the
new trial the following reasons: insufficient evidence of negligence, prejudice of a
juror, statements of P's counsel tending to prejudice the. jury against D, speed of the
verdict, consideration of the entire record and proceedings, and appearance and demeanor of witnesses. P appealed. Held: reversed and judgment for P according to-the
verdict. Rule 16 requires that in all cases where a trial court grants a motion for new
trial it shall in the order of granting the motion give definite reasons of law and facts
for so doing. The roasons based on the record are insufficient to warrant a new trial and
the reasons based upon the trial court's consideration of the proceedings and demeanor
of witnesses do not show in what way D was prejudiced thereby. Mulka v. Keyes, 41
Wn. 2d 427, 249 P2d 972 (1952).
The Supreme Court for many years has been committed to the proposition that the
trial court may in its discretion, grant a new trial on the ground that substantial justice has not been done. See Green, ProceduralProgressin Washington, 26 WAsH L
Rav. 87, 109 (1951). The requirement that the trial court list reasons for such a conclusion was added to the Rules in 1951, as a result of a discussion in Coppo v. Van
Wetringen, 36 Wn2d 120, 217 P.2d 294 (1950). In the Coppo case, Justice Hill indicated that the Supreme Court would be able to perform the appellate function more
effectively if the trial court were required to state reasons of law and fact for the
granting of the new trial order.
Washington, in allowing an appeal from an order granting a new trial is in a minority position. Most jurisdictions deny such appeal upon the ground of lack of finality

